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Abstract 
 
If Santner’s reading of Schmitt’s 
interpretation of Hamlet holds, then, using 
Brooks’s theory of the plot, we may 
support an ontological model of texts, 
applicable to the Later Wittgenstein and 
which ostensibly places the locus of his 
perduring relevance outside of the author 
into the same “device of too-muchness” of 
Hamlet. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In his work on the People’s two Bodies, 
Eric Santner [1] points to Schmitt’s 
interpretation of Hamlet [2] to develop, 
after Turk [3], the concept of intrusion 
(Einbruch) or “break-in”. Such concept is 
introduced with reference to the irruption 
of history into the theatrical space of the 
artwork in a special way, different from 
mere allusion or from explicit reference in 
the form of mirroring.  
An intrusion demands serious 
consideration because it touches on what 
Schmitt refers to as an Ernstfall, a serious or 
critical situation demanding decisive 
action without, however, providing the 
coordinates for such action. Such would 
be the possibility to identify Hamlet with 
King James I. Since no allusion is done in 
the drama to the King, neither He becomes 
a matter of representation, this possible 
identification can only represents an 
intrusion into the play, that makes the true 
“dream work” of the aesthetic realm get 
mobilized. 
Our work focuses on the fact that Schmitt 
– whatever one may think of his 
interpretation of Hamlet – in detecting the 
presence of James I as the central figure of 
the play, by way of symptomatic 
distortions in the drama, already 
emphasised by Eliot [4], points at the “end 
of the tragedy”, which is repoduced in 
Appendix 1. 
In this final Hamlet the hero gives his 
dying voice to Fortinbras as a transmission 
of royal legitimacy that really took place in 
1603, when Elizabeth gave her dying 
voice to the election of James. So the most 
famous last words of world literature are: 
 
 “tell him (Fortinbras) …which have 
solicited – the rest is silence”. 
 
Our aim is then to highlight the complete 
structural equivalence between this 
outstandingly known piece of literature 
and the end of the Tractatus[5]. 
The structure of it is precisely the 
definition of the world as the totality of 
what it happens, with the famous 
conclusion that : 
 
 “What we cannot speak about we 
must pass over in silence.”  
 
Horatio can tell Fortinbras just what it 
happened, and the rest is silence. All the 
folly of Hamlet, all that is passed in his 
mind, all the secrets of Ophelia’s despised 
love, all the mysteries of the court, and the 
intricancies of Hamlet’s mother 
involvement or not in his father’s murder, 
all this is silence. Horatio, as we, cannot 
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speak about it and it must pass over in 
silence. 
What is then the stance of Wittgenstein ? 
What is the stuff of the perduring myth of 
the Later Wittgenstein made of ? And may 
we really maintain and grasp the literal 
parallel of these two texts ending both 
with the word “silence” ?  
And, finally, supposing that we can, what 
the meaning of this all could be ? 
 
2. Related Works and Method 
 
Our method is related as well to “close 
reading”[6] as to the way of interpreting 
texts derived from Peter Brooks [7]. In 
particular this method has received a new 
formulation and new applications in 
Agamben’s “The end of the poem” [8].  
According to Brooks it is the end of a work 
of art which reveals the meaning of it 
through an investigation of the narrative 
plotting which implies its end as 
necessary. 
In both cases analyzed here we face a 
similar narrative structure of the plot: 
 
[world of events : speakability] – [world 
beyond events : un-speakability] 
 
This structure is deeper than expected, 
because it is at work also in Primo Levi’s 
accounts of the Shoah [9]. His attept 
having been to conclude that in really 
serious cases (Ernstfallen) it is possible only 
to give voice to witnesses of events, but it 
results impossible to produce a discourse 
on those events, and our aim is to relate 
such structure to the close analysis of the 
ending of Hamlet and to the Later 
Wittgenstein. 
Of course the literature pertaining to 
Hamlet is so huge that it cannot even be 
summarised in this note, but for a a direct 
reference to the Oxford Companion to 
Shakespeare[10] for any further reading.  
The same can be said also for the literature 
related to the Later Wittgenstein, and for 
his two main theories of linguistic games 
and of language as a form of life, and their 
reception in comparison with the Tractatus 
[11]–[14]. 
Our attempt is then to give room to the 
same theories of Wittgenstein, especially 
the theory of linguistic life-forms, applying 
them to the too-machness [1] – that which 
can never be fully contained – the excess 
of the two texts in comparison. 
I our view it is then possible to construct 
an ontological reading of texts where 
rhetorical figures are the connecting 
devices which link them together via the 
plotting structure underlying their 
composition. 
 
3. Our Model 
 
Our model, according to the method 
explained in the previous section, is based 
on a renewal of the classical “close 
reading” approach as a mean to investigate 
texts without any external reference to 
their context, or their standard 
classification into varying academic fields 
of enquiry, such as philosophy or fiction, 
psycho-analysis or sociology. From this 
standpoint our model, as we said, is 
similar to an extreme version of the model 
developed by the Yale New Critics[15], 
but it is completely disconnected from its 
untenable commitment toward the 
independence of aesthetics [16].  
In our model, texts may be seen as a kind 
of life-forms, that live and merge and 
reproduce themselves thanks to human 
agents, but independently from any 
consideration of intentionality of their 
authors. As such it is a pure ontological 
reading of texts treating them as  “living” 
objects, though their life is evidently not 
based on carbonium. 
Then if our model holds it follows that we 
must assume that the parallel between the 
end of the Shakesperean tragedy and the 
end of the Tractatus are too close to go  
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undetected, and that this proximity 
deserves to be explained. 
Perhaps this explanation may be 
constructed in a kind of diasystem of the 
cultural order. We could borrow this 
notion from comparative linguistics [17], 
[18], where it became outdated, but in 
some field still used[19], to denote a layer 
behind the different observed cultural 
variables, and that might account for their 
varied appearances. 
In our model, anyhow, the explanation lies 
in the locus of an imagery of the ineffable 
which trascends time and geographical 
location and that can be captured only 
through a reconsideration of the romantic 
aesthetics of the sublime [20]. 
This aesthetic is precisely devoted toward 
the appreciation of that which always 
beyond words, beyond the human 
capacity of expression. 
The importance of Hamlet for romanticism 
being well esteblished[21] what we need, 
and must search for, is a missing link 
between Wittgenstein and romanticism. 
But this link has been convincingly given 
by Eldgridge [22] . His study presents an 
account of Wittgenstein's "Philosophical 
Investigations", interpreting the text as 
displaying the human need to pursue an 
ideal of expressive freedom within the 
limits set by culture. The author sees 
Wittgenstein as a romantic protagonist 
pondering on the nature of intentional 
consciousness, and ranging over ethics, 
aesthetics and philosophy of mind. 
Leading a human life becomes a creative 
act, of continuously seeking to overcome 
both complacency and scepticism. 
4. Implementation 
 
In this section, we propose to consider the 
tentative hypothesis that what is seductive 
in the Later Wittgenstein is his 
romanticism as reconstructed in the 
previous section. This tentative hypothesis 
being built upon the background waves of 
Hamlet’s last words and Eldgrige’s study 
on Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical 
Investigations”.  
The conclusion to be derived from this 
hypothesis is that the contemporary  
audience of Wittgenstein is patently still 
captured in the setting of a romantic 
aesthetics, and that this paradigm can be 
thought as a perduring element in Western 
culture, notwithstanding any rationalist 
effort to exorcise it [23]. In a way the 
“sublime dimension”, or, as we prefer to 
call it, the “too-muchness device” operates 
as a remainder.  
Our model of close reading expressed in 
the previous section can so be 
implemented to become a tentative study 
of this remainder within the framework of 
Western rationalism and its inner  
impossibility. 
 
5. Evaluation and Results 
 
What can a theory of Wittgenstein as a 
romantic protagonist offer us ? 
As we said the matter is that of a return of 
a remainder that deprives a rational 
discourse about it of any legitimacy. 
This rather radical conclusion can be 
tested in different domains. 
 
5.1 The ironic nature of the text 
 
In detail we can now see how much, and 
to what extent, the very text of the 
Tractatus seem designed to undermine its 
own premises [12], [24]. 
This is even blatantly asserted by the 
Author in proposition 6.54: 
 
 “My propositions are elucidatory in 
this way: he who understands me finally 
recognizes them as senseless” 
 
This is of course a complete irony 
displayed by an author who at the end 
deprives his text of any validity, including 
its own conclusion. The recursive nature of 
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this irony can hardly being dismissed, 
since recursiveness was certainly a matter 
mastered by Wittgenstein. 
What, then, does this ironic ending mean? 
The rest of the proposition is famously 
alluding to the “ladder”[14] : when one 
has used the senseless propositions of the 
book as steps, to climb up beyond them, 
he must – so to speak – throw away the 
ladder after he as climbed up it. 
Here the language from ironic becomes 
openly metaphorical, which implies that 
the text can be appraised only via literary 
categories, undermining its own attempt to 
produce a logical order of the world of 
events.  
Besides, the language of the ladder is also 
patently a language of initiation. He who 
must acend toward a higher degree must 
throw away the ladder which he climbed 
up it. 
Once again, according to our model, we 
should not look for the intentionality of the 
author, but for the devices of the text itself 
and the effect on its audience as the locus 
in which its fascination is produced. But 
all this can’t bring us but to the conclusion 
that what operates as the production of 
meaning in the Tractatus is the same 
device which, pointing to the ineffable, 
deprives itself of its legitimacy. 
This conclusion has already been reached 
by other cited authors: our specificity is to 
highlight that this conlcusio is to be seen 
as the result of the working of the hidden 
remainder of the too-muchness device: an 
objective refoulé surfacing in 
Wittgenstein’s text as its own semantic 
excess producing its fascination.  In a 
sense, here, the meaning of the text is 
produced, ironically, by its deferment 
toward a dimension which by definition is 
beyond words. 
The end of the Tractatus, just in its 
resemblance to Hamlet’s death, would 
then become the locus par excellence of 
the emergence of inconclusiveness of all 
texts because of their necessarily excessive 
nature. 
5.2 The romantic experience 
 
At this point we could try to envisage 
further readings to rediscover and 
recentralize the problem of the aesthetic of 
the sublime within the framework of a 
wider concept of literature capable of 
including both the political and the 
philosophical domain, through the key 
concept of intrusion [3]. 
If we take the Tractatus seriously, the end 
of it can be seen as the emergence of an 
intrusion always there from the beginning 
and capable to surface only at the 
completion of the text. Its power as a 
remainder proved to be so great as to give 
birth to the configuration of a “Later 
Wittgenstein” as possibly distinct from a 
First Wittgenstein. But this way of referring 
to the author what can be a linguistic 
game of the texts is of course Un-
Wittgensteinean.  
On the other side in the final sentences of 
the Tractatus the author takes the lead 
himself: 
 
 “Meine Saetze…My propositions… 
He who understands me….” 
 
The impersonal composition of the 
preceeding propositions becomes a direct 
personal speech.  
What kind of a fracture has occured 
between proposition 6.53 and proposition 
6.54 ? 
There is a different possibility to be 
considered. That he who speaks at the end 
is not the author but the Tractatus. This 
would be a final allegory in the form of a 
prosopopeia (or personification), which 
descends from the mode of irony and the 
use of the metaphor of initiation to higher 
degrees of knowledge. 
But without plungung in this further 
hypothesis, that cannot be literarily 
excluded, the personal entrance of the 
author in his writing signals the existential 
dimension of the intrusion, from which we 
started in our introduction. Maybe here, to 
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paraphrase Eliot’s judgement on 
Shakespeare [4], the author encountered 
something he could not shape, he could 
not master, leaving us not with a precise 
formulation but with vague, slightly 
frightening but seducing emotions. 
From the standpoint of romantic sublime 
this vagueness is not to be condemned but 
to be appraised as the real existential 
embezzlement felt in the presence of the 
too-muchness. 
This same impossibility to decide if it is the 
author or the text speaking at the end, is a 
validation of the sublime experience as 
unlocatable within or without the subject 
of its experience. 
5.3 Denial and Anxiety 
 
Our hypothesis on the structural similarity 
of the end of Hamlet and the Tractatus is 
reinforced, rather than challenged, by the 
notorious oddly negative judgement 
expressed by Wittgenstein on Shakespeare 
[25], and here reproduced in Appendix 2. 
Though Schulte[26] has denied that 
Wittgenstein was referring to Shakespeare, 
but rather to himslef, the more widespread 
opinion remains that expressed by Steiner 
[27] that “a great logician and 
epistemologist can be a blind reader of 
literature” (p.126). But we do not need to 
recur to it if we adopt the model of the 
Anxiety of Influence elaborated by 
Bloom[28], and that we find consistent 
with our premises. 
In this peculiar case Wittgenstein’s 
judgement proves his interest into the 
Bard’s works, as well as it discloses the 
possibility to be read as a typical 
expression of influence, which becomes 
denied at explicit level, as well as it breaks 
in into the text. The structural symilarity 
we have noticed would, then, represents a 
denial of the influence which confirms its 
persistence.  
  
6. Conclusion 
 
Our main conclusion is of a general rather 
than particular order, and it is that we may 
build a framework of understanding of 
Wittgenstein’s perduring influence, based 
on the relevance of the same “device of 
too-muchness” of Hamlet. 
We could label this operativeness as the 
logic of the ineffable, peculiarly assumed 
at an explicit level by romantic aesthetics, 
but still operating, though under the 
surface, even at the level of philosophical 
investigations. 
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Appendixes 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
Hamlet, act 5, Scene 2, 352-356 
 
O, I die, Horatio. 
The potent poison quite o'ercrows my spirit. 
I cannot live to hear the news from England. 
But I do prophesy the election lights 
On Fortinbras. He has my dying voice. 
So tell him, with th' occurrents, more and less, 
Which have solicited. The rest is silence. 
 
APPENDIX 2 
 
People look at 
[Shakespeare] in amazement 
almost as a spectacle of 
nature. They do not have 
the feeling that this 
brings them into contact 
with a great human being. 
Rather with a phenomenon. 
It seems to me that 
[Shakespeare’s] plays are 
like enormous sketches, 
not paintings; they are 
dashed off by one who 
could, so to speak, permit 
himself everything. And I 
understand how one can 
admire this & call it the 
highest art, but I don’t 
like it. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value  
 
